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A Citizen's Obligation to the Law
The Ideal in Law. By Eugene V. Rostow. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1978. Pp. 295. $20.00.
Reviewed by Patrick Devlint
This is a book of lectures on various subjects and its title is as
descriptive of their highest common factor as can reasonably be ex-
pected. This means that the reader, if he hopes for a monograph on
idealism in law, will be disappointed. But it does not mean that
the book is no more than a jumble of pieces. Professor Rostow is
frequently invited to give public lectures, some of them very pres-
tigious: naturally he chooses a subject that is suited to time, place,
and audience. But he is also a man who has thought deeply and
widely on the nature of law, its ethical content, and its relation to
the social process, and come to general conclusions. These conclu-
sions link the chosen subjects.
I do not think that any of these lectures is printed exactly as it
was delivered. Lectures are drafted, delivered sometimes more than
once, revised sometimes, amplified and amalgamated, so that each
of the subjects has been thoroughly thought out. The first subject is
a study, historical and analytical, of "The Negro in our Law." The
second is on the obligation of the citizen to the law; mainly this
deals with the duty of obedience, but there is also an excellent dis-
cussion of the relationship between lawyer and client. The third
is on the ethics of competition: it includes a very informative com-
parison between American and British law on restraint of trade and
a chapter on the responsibility of corporate management. From the
latter I am astounded to learn that "takeover bid" has crept into
the language from British usage; I have always thought it to be an
uncouth Americanism. The fourth subject concerns force and morals
in international law; the author asks whether the United Nations
Charter is going the way of President Wilson's Covenant.
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I have now told the prospective reader all that he or she needs
to know, except that the writing is lucid and elegant with the con-
sequence that the book, however learned, is easy to read. This he
or she may well know already, since Professor Rostow has published
a number of similar books of essays and lectures which have given
pleasure and instruction to many.
A reviewer, who has discharged his proper task of saying what
a book is about and what its readers may expect from it, is con-
ventionally allowed a certain license to air his own views on any
topic that has particularly interested him. I shall take it in this case
in relation to the second of the four subjects, the citizen's obligation
to the law. I choose that one, partly because of its great contempo-
rary importance and partly because it affords a good illustration of
Rostow's clear analytical approach which stimulates thought and even
cautious disagreement. The author has a lot of ground to cover and
he wastes no words. He explores the theories of Rawls, Hart, Wolff,
and Dworkin. He does not touch on Bickel's view as expounded in
The Morality of Consent' which in effect comes later. Rostow fi-
nalized his thought on this subject in 1970 while Bickel was writing
in 1972 and 1973.
Has the citizen a moral obligation to obey the law? He has of
course a legal duty, enforceable by fines and imprisonment. But if
the only way of obtaining obedience is by the use of the "police
power," the height of repression necessary to produce the requisite
degree of fear would produce also the sort of life which most of us
would dislike. So there is wide agreement that a generally law-abid-
ing population is as necessary to the good of society as are the laws
themselves. The existence of the law-abiding population cannot be
ensured without a sense of mutual obligation which can only be
moral in character.
It is generally agreed that the moral obligation is not absolute. I
think that of its very nature it cannot be. It is an obligation that is
binding only on conscience and if the law requires the citizen to
do something which his conscience declares to him to be wrong, only
he can resolve the conflict. A society which accepts freedom of con-
science must accept his judgment as final: provided that his exami-
nation of his conscience is thorough and ends with his conclusion
that like Luther he can do none other and provided also that he
accepts the legal penalties, the suffering for conscience's sake, as the
price which society exacts from the man who puts his own judgment
1. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 91-123 (1975).
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above that of his peers. Professor Rostow cites Socrates as speaking
for the laws when he refused to flee from the death sentence validly,
but as he thought unjustly, imposed upon him. Two thousand years
later an Englishman paid the ultimate penalty for disobedience to
a statute which he did not challenge but could not obey, on the scaf-
fold exchanging his mortality for immortal words: "I die the King's
good servant, but God's first."
But in the common herd there will be many breaches of the law
which cannot be morally justified on grounds of conscience. Accept-
ance of a moral principle is one thing and obedience to it when it
hurts, or sometimes when it is no worse than troublesome, is another.
Who is there among us who has not disregarded a legal speed limit?
Since morality works on conscience, so it must be rooted in an ethic
-or be a part of some ethical conplex such as religion-which com-
pels the conscience. In my childhood this presented no difficulty.
Christianity taught the duty to obey the lawful government in all
that was not sin. Every child knew about rendering to Caesar the
things that were Caesar's and about "the powers that be" that were
ordained of God: "whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth
the ordinance of God." 2 This teaching or the attitude that has arisen
out of it is probably still the backbone of obedience to the law. But
it is weakening and in the secular state cannot be invoked. So it is
up to moral philosophers to find a principle acceptable to the ir-
religious. Their findings vary from the old idea of allegiance at one
end to Rousseau's theory of the Social Contract at the other. Ac-
cording to the former,
each person is bound by ties of allegiance to the sovereignty of a
nation, to its laws and to its social code, by the fact of residence
or citizenship. Allegiance, the lawbooks have said for centuries, is
the reciprocal of the protection each person receives through living
in an organized community.3
This is what we now call the rule of law. The Social Contract, by
contrast, is a metaphor embodying "a core of quintessential ideas,
values and customs, defining the ultimate norms of the society, and
binding all who share its culture. . . . The Social contract binds




3. E. Rosrow, THE IDEAL IN LAW 96 (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
4. P. 94-95.
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These two descriptions are very alike. There is, however, at any
rate for those who accept Jefferson on Rousseau, a sharp distinction.
"The essence of Jefferson's thesis . . . is that unless the citizen can
participate responsibly in the making of the laws, he is not morally
bound to obey them.";; This makes the existence of democratic gov-
ernment essential to an obligation to obey the law. I find this a
startling proposition. The obligation to obey the law is much older
than any post-Rousseau democracy. Are philosophers going to release
the subjects of all nondemocratic states of all moral duty to obey
the law of their countries? That experiment was tried in 1570 when
Pope Pius V released all Queen Elizabeth's English Catholic subjects
from their duty of obedience to "the powers that be"; it was not a
success.
Professor Rostow does not make it quite clear to me where he
stands on this. He hardly notices the grey area between tyranny and
democracy. He describes what I take to be the Rousseau-Jefferson
theory as "the only modern rival for the doctrine that power proceeds
from the barrel of a gun."6 He dislikes Professor Hart's theory (Hart,
he says, infers "a promissory obligation, either from the citizen's
voluntary participation in a society he is free to leave, or from the
reliance of other citizens, who have obeyed the law in the expectation
of his obedience in turn") because it "does not permit a discrimina-
tion between the citizen's obligation to the law in a tyranny and in
a democracy."7 This distinction, Rostow says, is the heart of the
matter. He is of course writing of and for a country that was borne
straight into democracy; in Georgian and Victorian Britain two cen-
turies intervened between the glorious revolution of 1688 and the
universal suffrage (male only) of 1918.
But then Professor Rostow writes that "the substantive content of
the social contract is not the same in all societies." What is meant
by "the substantive content" of the Contract? In the preceding para-
graph Rostow writes:
It may be more direct, and more realistic, to draw the moral ele-
ment in the citizen's obligation to the law from the necessary
conditions of social cooperation within different kinds of societies.
The obligation to the law of a citizen in a liberal, democratic
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tions of tyranny. The spacious tolerance of a free society is pos-
sible only if the laws are generally accepted and respected volun-
tarily, so that the role of force and coercion in the society can
be kept to a minimum. The idea of a free society posits a much
higher degree of civic responsibility on the part of each citizen
than the concept of a tyranny or a system of paternalism. 9
This is a passage, which if it is read as the language of exhortation,
I find very appealing. But I cannot accept it as qualifying the obli-
gation. Whatever the nature of the society, the citizen's obligation,
if it exists, is an obligation to obey all law so far as his conscience
permits. It is not an obligation that can vary in size or strength or
substantive content. The variable can find a place only in the way
in which it is discharged. It is right to remind the citizens of a liberal
democratic society that they should be especially scrupulous in their
observance of the law. But the terms of the obligation, when it
applies, must surely be the same for all; it cannot be drawn up so
as to give the subjects of paternalism a limited license to disobey
the more irksome laws.
The Jeffersonian requirement of responsible participation in law-
making raises another difficulty with which Rostow deals. No one
would dispute that a man who in his own person consents to a law,
participates thereby in the making of it; nor, if he sat on the jury
that convicted a man of a breach of it would it be disputed that he
had consented to its application. Thus certainly is the requirement
that government shall be with the consent of the governed fulfilled.
But, so Professor Wolff contends, nothing short of a law adopted
unanimously by all the citizenry will satisfy: to be bound each must
consent individually. 10 This is not in modern democracy what Rostow
calls "an operational idea."" In modern democracy, which is repre-
sentative and not participatory, the consent that is required from
the individual can be no more than consent to the process by which
laws are made and administered. A citizen may disapprove of a
particular law and his disapproval may be shared by a majority of
his fellow citizens, since in representative democracy a minority is
frequently effective. But, if it has emerged constitutionally out of
the legislative machine, the citizen is deemed to have consented to it.
Why adorn this assumed consent by calling it a Social Contract?
It is not a contract in any sense of the term, metaphorical or literal.
9. P. 93.
10. See Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, in Is LAw DEAD? 110 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
11. P. 105.
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It is based on the pretense that a man is free to choose the nation
or group to which he wishes to belong and to make a bargain with
it. In truth no one is free to choose the society in which he is born
and to be brought up. But in that society he has to stay at least
until he is old enough to apply for a passport to leave. If then he
decides to stay, whatever bound him as a juvenile continues to bind
him as an adult. You may say it is force of circumstances, or you may
describe it romantically as allegiance or group loyalty or prosaically
as a necessary condition of social cooperation. Or you may fictionalize
it as a contract, but the fiction is dangerous because it spawns a
lot of questions about exactly what the subject is supposed to have
consented to and by what, if anything, the young and unenfranchised
are bound and so forth, with all of which Professor Rostow has to deal.
For myielf I like Professor Hart's way of putting the case. When
benefits and obligations are interdependent, a man cannot take the
benefit and refuse the burden. But he should be free to refuse both
and to make another choice of domicile if he can find one that suits
him better. It is the existence or denial of this freedom that is the
test. In determining whether or not the citizen has a moral obligation
to obey the law, the test is not whether the state is autocratic, oligarchic,
or democratic, but whether it will permit a dissentient to leave on
reasonable terms. If it will, he must either quit or obey.
A disbelief in the existence of God does not clothe the individual
with original sovereignty. A force, far-seeing or blind but outside his
control, determines his birth, his domicile and his character, and
shapes his destiny. With exceptions too rare to be taken into account,
a man cannot live without society and society cannot live without
laws. So whatever the nature of a society, a man born into it is born
under allegiance which he can cast off only by flight or by rebellion.
Of the right to rebel there is much to be said, but it cannot be said
by lawyers.
Variations on a Theme by Thomas Jefferson
The Pursuit of Equality in American History. By Jack R. Pole.
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press,
1978. Pp. xv, 380. $14.95.
Reviewed by Philip B. Kurlandt
Thomas Jefferson, in whose memory the lectures collected in this
book1 were delivered, played little or no role in the framing of the
American Constitution. The notion of James Madison as Jefferson's
messenger at the Convention of 17892 is no longer creditable, if it ever
was. Jefferson was, however, as we all know, the principal author of
the Declaration of Independence. And today a case could well be made
that a single sentence of that Declaration has become de facto "the
supreme law of the land": "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
Pursuit of Happiness."3 The Supreme Court may soon discover that
this sentence is to be found in the Ninth Amendment and/or in the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, after
which the rest of the Constitution can be regarded as auxiliary if not
redundant.
Perhaps this suggestion is no more than hyperbolic shorthand for the
proposition that courts are in the process of rejecting the positive law
engrossed in the words of the Constitution in favor of the natural law
implicit in the Declaration, just as some of our most prominent juris-
prudes would have it.4 Certainly it must be conceded that the Supreme
Court has given priority to whatever values it thinks are represented by
-- William R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor in The College and Pyofessor
in The Law School, The University of Chicago.
1. J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1978) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
2. See E. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-89, at 131 (1956) ('Jefferson's
views were ably represented by James Madison"); A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON 3-96
(1950) (describing "great collaboration" between these two men at time of Convention).
3. What the sentence was intended to mean is still an unresolved question. For the
most recent and interesting parsing of the sentence, see G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA
167-255 (1978).
4. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); C. FRIE, AN ANATOMY OF
VALUES (1970).
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the concept of equality,5 although the word itself is not to be found in
the Constitution except in the phrase of the Fourteenth Amendment
commending equal protection of the laws for all persons.0
Professor Pole's book is concerned with tracing equality as a recur-
rent theme in American history. It is not a constitutional history, except
in the recognition that the Constitution may absorb dominant moral
themes in American society. Thus, the notion of equality appears in
different guises at different times in our history, beginning with a
meaning that calls for the abolition of state-sponsored or state-protected
privileges, continuing through "equality of opportunity," and arriving
today at the notion of what Pole calls "equalization of results."
Throughout this volume Pole is concerned with the problem of
reconciling the concept of equality with the concept of individuality, a
reconciliation that he believes to be constitutionally commanded. He
notes at the very outset of the book:
I see egalitarian principles in the light of a Western tradition in
which they are legitimised by a profound, not a merely per-
functory, respect for individuality, and which emphasises the dis-
tinctions among people as well as their similarities; and I regard
this emphasis as logically consistent with the requirements of the
United States Constitution, more especially since the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Not surprisingly, then, he ends where he began:
This burden [to justify disparities of "equality of results"], how-
ever, contains several imperfectly reconciled ingredients of which
the most important is that the Constitution extends its protection
equally to all-to every individual on American soil-in his or her
capacity as an independent and irreducible individual. No con-
stitutionally acceptable outcome can conflict with that obligation.
It is the individual whose rights are the object of the special
solicitude of the Constitution and for whose protection the Re-
public had originally justified its claim to independent existence.0
5. See P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 98-169 (1970).
6. It is apparently heresy to suggest that the contemporary interpretation of the equal
protection clause is not based, as it should be, on the intentions of those who framed the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Raoul Berger's recent book, see R. BERGER, GOVERN.MENT
nY JUDICIARY (1977), has been roundly trounced by the academic priests of the dominant
egalitarian dogma, not because its scholarship is invalid-it has not been shown to be in
error on this score-but because it is a sin to suggest that we should be controlled by the
"original meaning." See, e.g., Brest, Berger v. Brown et al., N.Y. Times (Book Rev.), Dec.
11, 1977, at 10, col. I; Miller, Do the Founding Fathers Know Best?- Wash. Post, Nov. 13,
1977, at ES, col. 1. For Berger's response, see Berger, Government by Judiciary: Some
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This is not merely an academic problem; it was the underlying issue
dividing the Supreme Court in the recent notorious case of Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,' even if the jurists did not
directly confront the dilemma. Indeed, some of the Justices-those who
would have denied Bakke's admission-assumed that the concept of
"equality of results" is implicit in the Constitution," though Mr.
Justice Powell12 and presumably the Justices who joined in Mr. Justice
Stevens's opinion 13 asserted the traditional position that the Constitu-
tion was concerned with the protection of individuals rather than
classes.
Pole is no more successful in unraveling this Gordian knot than was
the Court. He chooses to cut it by use of the "co-ordinate principle of
interchangeability.' 4 He writes:
The advance of equality as a principle of constitutional law has
been based in the United States as in other Western countries on
the precept of legal and moral individualism. The individual,
being of full age and sound mind, is held to be accountable and
responsible for his, or her own conduct, and it is each individual
who is entitled to claim the full and unalienable rights of man.
The individualist principle dissociates people from the context of
family, religion, class, or race and when linked with the idea of
equality in the most affirmative sense-a sense widely accepted
throughout a large part of American history-it assumes the co-
ordinate principle of interchangeability."5
The "co-ordinate principle of interchangeability," however, is either
a rejection of the notion of the uniqueness of each individual so that
persons are fungible, or it means no more than the proposition that
family, religion, class, or race are invalid bases for governmentally
created privileges or sanctions. The first meaning is, of course, totally
destructive of "individuality . . . which emphasises the distinctions
among people as well as their similarities."' 6 The second meaning-the
classic view that government cannot classify on the basis of factors ir-
relevant to its legitimate legislative ends-would call for a definite
10. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
11. See id. at 2766 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting).
12. See id. at 2788 (opinion of Powell, J.).
13. See id. at 2809 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). The opinion was joined by
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withdrawal from some of the rules of "equality of results" recently
written into our national laws both by Congress and by the courts.
17
But this fatal flaw in Pole's thesis does not destroy the very great
worth of this history of the idea of equality, an idea of no mean im-
portance in the development of American society. That history is well
told. Certainly, it will be enlightening, if not consoling, even to those
who think that they already know all they need to know about the
subject. The defect does not lie in the author's capabilities, but, as he
acknowledges, is intrinsic in the intractable nature of the subject:
The pursuit of equality was the pursuit of an illusion, because
equality was a complex concept and not a simple or single goal.
The mere fact of occupying new and higher ground in the pur-
suit changed the perspective of the viewer. The concept of equality,
once unfolded, was a source of intense gratification, challenge,
and excitement, but it was found also to be full of variations, or
proliferating rewards and deceits.'
The conclusion of at least this reader, though, is that we shall soon
have greater and greater governmentally imposed "equality of results,"
just as the academic bible commands.' 9 And so, hail to equality; fare-
well to individuality, farewell to excellence, farewell to civility. Govern-
ment, like religion and war, is indeed a great leveller.
17. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16, at 991-1136 (1978).
18. P. 292.
19. See J. RAWIS, A THEORY OF JuSTCE (1971).
